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Book Review
Thinking About Race and Races: Reflections and
Responses
RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE AMERICA.

Edited By Juan F. Pereat Richard Delgadott Angela P. Harris,ttt and
Stephanie M. Wildman.tttt
St. Paul: West Group, 2000. Pp. xlix, 1171. $60.00 cloth.
Certain absences are so stressed, so ornate, so planned, they call
attention to themselves; arrest us with intentionality and purpose,
like neighborhoods that are defined by the population held away
from them ....The spectacularly interesting question is "What
intellectual feats had to be performed by the author or his critic to
erase me from a society seething with my presence, and what effect
has that performance had on the work?" What are the strategies of
escape from knowledge? Of willful oblivion?
Toni Morrison'
I
REFLECTIONS ON RACE AND RACES

The presence of people of color haunts the United States. Race and
racism are central to the history, the mythology, and the basic institutions
of American life, including American legal institutions. Yet American
public discourse has seldom been forthright about the existence and implications of American racism. Thus, for example, prior to the Thirteenth
Amendment in 1865, the Constitution never mentioned the word "slavery."
The drafters of the Constitution were scrupulously careful not to include
the word anywhere in the document, even as they crafted compromises that
protected and recognized the peculiar institution.2
Copyright ©c2001 California Law Review, Inc. California Law Review, Inc. (CLR) is a California
nonprofit corporation. CLR and the authors are solely responsible for the content of their publications.
'r
Cone, Wagner, Nugent, Johnson, Hazouri & Roth Professor of Law, University of Florida.
I
Jean Lindsley Professor of Law, Univeristy of Colorado.
'if Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley (Boalt Hall).
i1t Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School.
1. Toni Morrison, Unspeakable Things Unspoken: The Afro-American Presence in American
Literature, in WITHIN THE CIRCLE: AN ANTHOLOGY OF AFRICAN AMERICAN LITERARY CRITICISM
FROM THE HARLEM RENAISSANCE TO THE PRESENT 378 (Angelyn Mitchell ed., 1994); see also TONI
MomRSON, PLAYING IN THE DARK (1992).
2. See DERRICK BELL, RACE, RAcIsM AND AMERICAN LAW 46-48 (4th ed. 2000) (listing the
clauses that protected the institution of slavery).
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The framers maintained this constitutional silence, it seems, to preserve the ideological integrity of the document.' More recent silences about
race in legal discourse seem intended to protect the public from being confronted with the enormity of racial injustice. For example, in decisions like
Shaw v. Reno,4 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia,5 and Rice v.
Cayetano,6 the Supreme Court has found governmental racial classifications unconstitutional under the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments
even when their purpose has been to ameliorate racial inequality and
strengthen the political power of racialized and historically subordinated
communities. In McCleskey v. Kemp,7 the Court refused to recognize a
claim of systemic racial discrimination in the administration of the death
penalty for fear of undermining the criminal justice system itself, a fear
dissenting justice William Brennan described as "a fear of too much
justice."' In these and other decisions, the Court has treated government
recognition of race as inherently divisive and antidemocratic. Yet these
decisions, imposing public silence on the issue of race, have had the practical effect of maintaining historical and continuing racialized inequalities of
political and economic power.
The repercussions of this silence about the racialized injustice that so
pervades American society are perhaps most haunting in areas that public
discourse treats as race-free. In its recent decision in United States v.
Morrison,9 for example, the Court held that Congress lacked authority under either the Commerce Clause or Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to create a federal civil remedy for victims of gendermotivated violence, thus invalidating a portion of the Violence Against

3.
In debating the wording of Article I, Section 9, which prohibited Congress from using its new
commerce powers to restrict the importation of slaves, Speaker of the House Dayton was unambiguous
about the reason for omitting the word "slave" from the constitutional text:
[1]n the discussion of its merits, no question arose, or was agitated respecting the admission
of foreigners, but, on the contrary, that it was confined simply to slaves, and was first voted
upon and carried with that word expressed in it, which was afterwards upon reconsideration
changed for "such persons," as it now stands .... The sole reason assigned for changing it
was that it would be better not to stain the Constitutional code with such a term, since it could
be avoided by the introduction of other equally intelligible words, as had been done in the
former part of the same instrument, where the same sense was conveyed by the circuitous
expression of"three fifths of all other persons."
Debate in the House of Representatives (June 16-20, 1798), in 3 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL

CONVENTION OF 1787, at 377 (Max Farrand ed., 1966).
4. 509 U.S. 630 (1993) (redistricting legislation that is "unexplainable on grounds other than
race" demands strict scrutiny).
5. 515 U.S. 200 (1995) (strict scrutiny is appropriate for all government racial classifications,
whether created by federal or state governments).
6. 528 U.S. 495 (2000).
7. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
8. 481 U.S. at 339 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
9. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). See also Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356
(200 1) (declaring state governments immune from suit under the Americans With Disabilities Act).
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Women Act (VAWA). ° Reviewing the scope of congressional power under Section 5, the Court held that because the Fourteenth Amendment applies only to state action, Congress had no power to create a civil remedy
against private persons who engage in gender-motivated violence. This
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is not compelled by the constitutional text itself, however, but is based on two cases decided shortly
after the adoption of the amendment, United States v. Harris' and the Civil
Rights Cases.'2 According to the Morrison Court:
The force of the doctrine of stare decisis behind these decisions
stems not only from the length of time they have been on the
books, but also from the insight attributable to the Members of the
Court at that time. Every Member had been appointed by President
Lincoln, Grant, Hayes, Garfield, or Arthur-and each of their
judicial appointees obviously had intimate knowledge and
familiarity with the events surrounding the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment."3
What the Court does not say is that when these cases were decided,
the Supreme Court was engaged in a war with Congress over race and racism: a war in which the Court moved time and time again to thwart the
project of making African Americans equal citizens. Akhil Amar points
out, for example, that the intent behind section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment reflected, in part, congressional desire to overrule the Court's
infamous decision in DredScott 4 that Blacks in America had no rights that
White persons were bound to respect. 5 Amar asks why the Rehnquist
Court should choose to look for meaning in the interpretations of a hostile
Supreme Court and not in the statements of the drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment.6
The Court's silence about our racial past has not only skewed its approach to statutory interpretation. Robert Post and Reva Siegel argue that
10. In deciding the Commerce Clause issue, the Court relied on its analysis in United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). The Court held that, while the line between the economic and
noneconomic is not always crystal clear, "[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense
of the phrase, economic activity." Morrison,529 U.S at 613.
1I. 106 U.S. 629 (1882).
12.
109 U.S. 3 (1883).
13. Morrison,529 U.S. at 622.
14. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1856).
15. Akthil Reed Amar, The Supreme Court 1999 Term: Foreword: The Document and the
Doctrine, 114 HARv. L. REv. 26 (2000).
16. As Amar argues:
Many of the Congressmen supporting these laws had been leading architects of the
Fourteenth Amendment itself. Why doesn't Chief Justice Rehnquist accord these men any
epistemic respect? Founders such as James Madison and Thomas Jefferson, who lived and
died as slaveholders, are treated with reverence by the Court (even though Jefferson was not
even in America at the Founding). Why are Reconstructors like John Bingham and Charles
Sumner, crusaders for racial justice, treated with so much less respect?
Id. at 105-06.
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the substantive scope of congressional power under Section 5, and the
meaning of Section l's guarantees, can be understood only by understanding our nation's long political and legal struggle over racial injustice. 7 In
passing over this history in silence, they argue, the Court's recent decisions
concerning congressional power to pass antidiscrimination legislation
threaten to construct a jurisprudence that is not only "mechanical" but may
8
diminish the authority both of the Court and of the Constitution itself.
The silences, omissions, and strained reasoning in these cases are not,
in our view, the result simply of faulty reasoning or a misunderstanding of
precedent. Rather, the cracks in Morrison's analysis, and in the Court's
jurisprudence of congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment
more generally, betray the effort required to ignore a central truth of
American jurisprudence: that the constitutional principles of federalism
and separation of powers on which Morrison and like cases turn are inextricably intertwined with the history of race and racism.
As the majority in Morrison acknowledged, "the principle that the
Constitution created a Federal Government of limited powers, while reserving a generalized police power to the States is deeply ingrained in our
constitutional history."' 9 But this principle, in turn, is seething with the
presence of slavery, conquest, racial terror, and apartheid. These are the
unquiet ghosts in the machine of federalism jurisprudence. Race and Races

17. Robert C. Post & Reva B. Siegel, Equal Protection by Law: Federal Antidiscrimination
LegislationAfter Morrison and Kimel, 110 YALE L.J. 441 (2000). Post and Siegel write:
The Congress that passed the Fourteenth Amendment knew that it could not establish
equality for the newly freed slaves without reaching deep into Southern society and reforming
its fundamental principles. That is why it drafted Section 5. But the Supreme Court, fearing a
disruption of the balance of the federal system, refused to allow this exercise of federal
power, and instead created doctrines that shielded the right of state legal systems to segregate
and the freedom of private property owners to discriminate.
Even after the gates of federal power were thrown open during the New Deal, it was still
not clear whether the national government had the power to overcome these deeply inbred
practices and principles of discrimination. It was not until Brown changed the standards of
Section Ithat this objective became imaginable. And even then, it was not until thousands of
protests forced the federal hand that Congress was finally willing to enact the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 to accomplish what the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment thought they had
achieved.
When we speak of using the values of federalism to restrict the scope of federal power in
the context of national antidiscrimination statutes, therefore, we are speaking of a trust put
into federal hands by the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment, taken away by the Court for
almost a century, but, after struggle, returned to national authority in the 1960s. This
assumption of federal authority was vindicated by all three branches of the federal
government. The question of federalism thus merges with the question of the federal
government's proper role in combating discrimination. For whatever might be said about
Section 5 power generally, the use of Section 5 power to combat unconstitutional
discrimination cannot be conceived as a potential threat to the legitimate balance of the
federal system so long as this history retains its normative force.
Id. at 507-08.
18. Id. at 446.
19. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619 (internal quotations omitted).
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is our attempt to give form and substance to the unquiet ghosts whose stories lie deep in American legal and constitutional history.
As one of us has recently noted, the story of "race law" is ordinarily
taken to be the story of equality law.2" In this equality story, despite many
setbacks, "We, the People" gradually enlarges to embrace everyone.
African Americans are the central characters in this story. Their inspiring
journey from slavery to freedom, from apartheid to the American mainstream, is taken as a metonym for the optimistic story of American racial
struggle generally, a story that ends with Martin Luther King, Jr.'s "I Have
a Dream" speech."
While the African American struggle against slavery and for equality
retains central importance in United States history and in our book, Race
and Races attempts to tell a more comprehensive story of race in the
United States. It is an alternative to the fragmented, separated treatment
that racial topics typically receive, if treated at all, in the law school curriculum (p. 2). As Professor Robert Williams, Jr., notes, we have attempted
to produce a book which presents "multiple race perspectives on American
law," to teach "how the rule of law has been applied to a much broader set
of racial minority groups in this country, and the strategies those groups
have adopted to survive and create a diverse America. 22
We hope to teach students that race has always mattered in the United
States, and that it continues to matter in many ways that they may or may
not have understood before. Some of the most profoundly important events
inthe early history of the colonies and the country were racial events. The
conquest, displacement, and removal of Indians yielded land for the expansion of the colonies, and later the United States (pp. 173-216). The enslavement of Black Africans supplied labor for Southern agriculture (pp.
91-129). We still confront the powerful repercussions of these events today
in Indian claims for self-determination (pp. 220-28) and in African American claims for reparations (p.412).23
One striking way to understand the relevance of race to legal education is to consider the enormous amount of law, assumed to be independent
and unrelated, that nonetheless emerges as closely related when race and
racism are used as organizing principles. For example, law school curricula
20. Angela P. Harris, Equality Trouble: Sameness and Difference in Twentieth-Century Race
Law, 88 CALI. L. REv. 1923, 1927-28 (2000).
21. See A TEsTmErr OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF MARTIN LUTHER
KING, JR. 217 (James M. Washington ed., 1991). See also Juan F. Perea, The Black/White Binary
Paradigm of Race: The "Normal Science" of American Racial Thought, 85 CALIF. L. REv. 1213
(1997); Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Fifteenth Chronicle: Racial Mixture, Latino-CriticalScholarship,
and the Black-White Binary, 75 TEX. L. REv. 1181 (1997) (noting that equality law, and civil rights
generally, are commonly equated with the African American experience).
22. Robert Williams, Jr., Do You Believe in the Rule of Law?, 89 CALIF. L. REv 1633, 1637
(2001).
23. See, e.g., RANOALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT (2000).
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may typically include separate courses on Indian Law, Immigration Law or
History, Civil Rights, and Equal Protection. These are all treated as separate and discrete disciplines. This curricular separation tends to obscure the
independent significance of race and racism. As Professor Margalynne
Armstrong points out, when students are not exposed to the racial dynamics lurking in these other courses, issues of race and racism that should be
raised are instead ignored. 4
When race and racism are used as lenses through which to view the
law in these traditionally separate subject areas, a unified story of race in
the United States emerges. For example, consider how Europeans sought to
justify the conquest of Indians and the usurpation of Indian lands by presuming the inferiority of Indian peoples. As Chief Justice Marshall wrote
in Johnson v. McIntosh, "the character and religion of [the Indians]
afforded an apology for considering them as a people over whom the
superior genius of Europe might claim an ascendancy" (pp. 175-76).
Europeans justified Black slavery in similar terms. Indeed, abolitionism
and the struggle against Jim Crow included, as central components, challenges to the presumed inferiority of Blacks (pp. 141-56). From 1790 to
1952, immigration law was a remarkable forum for the development and
definition of Whiteness and the exclusion of many non-Whites. In 1790,
the first condition for naturalized citizenship was that one be a "free white
person," presumed to be fit, temperamentally, intellectually, and morally,
to participate in the affairs of government (p. 583). Of course, in Dred
Scott v. Sandford (pp. 123-25), the Supreme Court decided that Africans
and African Americans, whether slave or free, were never intended to be
considered citizens under the federal constitution. During the latter half of
the nineteenth century, the federal courts decided who qualified as a "white
person" for naturalization (pp. 429-33). The courts, including the Supreme
Court, decided that immigrants from China, Japan, India, and other nations
were not "white" and therefore not entitled to citizenship (pp. 429-40).25
Astonishingly, the racial qualification for naturalization remained in place
until 1952.26
Thus, traditional civil rights law and equal protection, Indian law, and
immigration law all form important parts of the history and construction of
racial identities in the United States. Remarkably, even integrating all of
these ostensibly disparate areas of law, one would learn nearly nothing
about Latinos/as." Much of the story of Latinos/as in the United States lies
in the race-based conquest of Mexico and later Puerto Rico, and in the
24. Margalynne Armstrong, Teaching by the Book, 89 CALui. L. REv. 1625, 1626-27 (2001).
25. See also IAN HANEY LOPEZ, Wr-rrE BY LAW (1996).
26. Id. at 49.
27. See, e.g., Juan F. Perea, Los Olvidados: On the Making of Invisible People, 70 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 965 (1995) (describing the production of Latino/a invisibility); THE LA-nNO/A CoNDrriON: A
CRITlCAL READER (Richard Delgado & Jean Stefancic eds., 1998).
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extraordinary legal process through which one-half of Mexico became the
Southwestern United States (pp. 246-97). After the military conquest, this
legal process began with the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo in 1848 (pp.
260-66), and continued with land grant adjudications decided by the Taney
Court and later Courts in the mid-to-late nineteenth century (275-98). Litigation continues even today over the validity of dispositions of Mexican
land grants.28
While White racism has influenced powerfully the destinies of all
people of color in this country, it is important to understand that the forms
that racism takes are not the same with respect to each of the groups affected by it. Including multiple race perspectives in our book provides historical background for understanding the varied ways that racism affected
and affects different communities of color. By giving prominent attention
to the particular histories of the major racial groups in the United States,
including Whites (pp. 429-99),29 we hope to facilitate important comparisons, linkages, and distinctions regarding the conditions faced by the different groups. For example, consider the period 1880-1900. In 1882, antiChinese agitation in California culminated in congressional enactment of
the federal Chinese Exclusion Act, which prohibited the immigration of
Chinese laborers into the United States (pp. 382-84). Subsequently, the
Supreme Court upheld the exclusion acts in 1889 in Chae Chan Ping (p.
384-88). In 1887, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, also known
as the Dawes Act, which destroyed Indian tribal sovereignty by breaking
up lands held jointly by the tribes and allotting these lands in separate parcels to individual tribal members (pp. 215-16). This Act led to reductions
in the land base controlled by Indian tribes. And in 1896, the Supreme
Court decided Plessy v. Ferguson (pp. 142-47),31 upholding and encouraging racial segregation. In 1898, during the Spanish-American War, the
United States conquered Puerto Rico, Cuba, and the Philippines and invaded Hawaii (326-28).
Thus, during this twenty-year period, aggressive United States colonialism combined with severe internal repression of racial minorities. Only
by comparing the histories of the different racial groups can one identify
and explain this phenomenon. Indeed, Race and Races illustrates how
United States racial history follows a zigzag path, sometimes forwards,

28. See, e.g., PETER NABOKOV, TUERINA AND THE COURTHOUSE RAID (1969);
Symposium: Understandingthe Treaty of GuadalupeHidalgo on its 150th Anniversary, 5 Sw. J. L. &
TRADE AM. 5 (1998).
29. See also CRmcAL W.rrE STtrUDs: LOOKING BEHMIN
THE MIRROR (Richard Delgado &
Jean Stefancic eds., 1997).
30.
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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often backwards.3" Readers will also discover how this is not at all accidental.32 Society often arranges it so that one racial group is in favor while
another is intensely repressed.33 Seeing the checkerboard of racial progress
and the way groups are often played off against each other helps the reader
understand the behavior of higher courts today.
Professor Abrams suggests that a chronological sequence might have
been preferable for facilitating such comparisons.34 We respectfully disagree. Part of the aim of providing separate chapters for the major racial
groups was to demonstrate the nature, degree, and particularity of the racism experienced by each and to emphasize the trends and advances just
described. Not all racism is the same, nor has it played out in the same way
for each group. These dynamics and particularities likely would have been
osbscured had we taken a purely chronological approach.
II
RESPONSES TO REVIEWS OF

Race and Races

As Professors Abrams and Yamamoto correctly note, the authors of a
casebook are in a luckier position than most: we have the opportunity to
correct our mistakes in subsequent editions.35 We embrace several goals for
the next edition that the contributors to this colloquy have identified.
Professor Yamamoto suggests a richer chapter on Asian Americans and an
extended treatment of reparations.36 Professor Abrams suggests a sustained
examination of the relationship between race, class, and poverty. We also
take to heart Abrams' suggestion that we pay more attention to lawyering
strategies beyond the strictly conventional and the purely interpersonal.
Beyond these, some of our reviewers raised issues requiring more extensive responses.
A.

ProfessorAbrams

Abrams' suggestion that the book could use "more emphasis on the
affirmative meanings assigned to race"37 is an interesting one. If all
Abrams means by her suggestion is that we could have added material on
the unintended benefits of racial segregation, that is certainly right. Perhaps

31.
See also Richard Delgado, Derrick Bell's Toolkit-Fit toDismantle That Famous House?,75
N.Y.U. L. REv. 283 (2000); CRITiCAL RACE THEORY: THE CtrrriNG EDGE (Richard Delgado & Jean
Stefancic eds., 2d ed. 1999).
32. Id. at 290-93.
33. Id.at291.
34. See Kathryn Abrams, Race and Races: Constructing a New Legal Actor, 89 CALIF. L. REv.
1589, 1601 (2001).
35. See id.at 1602; Eric K. Yamamoto, Teaching Race Through Law: "Resourcesfor a Diverse
America", 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1641, 1645 (2001).
36. See Yamamoto, supranote 35, at 1645-5 1.
37. See Abrams, supra note 34, at 1599.
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we should have also made more references to the racial pride and kinship
that most people of color feel deeply. But Abrams' comment raises a
deeper question that many have struggled with: are there, in fact,
"affirmative meanings assigned to race"? Certainly as an accidental byproduct, racism has given rise to political solidarity, family feeling among
strangers, a vivid sense of historical connection to those who came before;
vibrant cultural traditions; and deep commitments to justice. But are these
"affirmative meanings assigned to race"? Or are they inherently reactive in
nature? If racism were somehow vanquished, what would be left of race?
Noel Ignatiev, calling for the abolition of the White race, argues that
Whiteness is nothing but the label for unjust privilege (pp. 489-93). Does
"race" itself have content, once it is disentangled from cultural, historical,
and political identity? We think we have done right by not answering these
questions. Indeed, given that racism is unlikely to be eliminated any time
soon, it is not clear that these questions are pressing ones. Instead, since the
central meaning of "race" seems to turn on historically contingent value
judgments, beliefs and faiths that support relationships of differential
power and subordination, our approach has been to examine the nature of
the historical development and expression of these beliefs.
One lesson our book teaches is that the dominant society in practically
every era has assigned positive images to itself and to Whiteness. One
chapter of Race and Races (pp. 429-99), for example, details how color
imagery and invisible privileges provide an "affirmative meaning assigned
to (the white) race" (pp. 464-78). By the same token, popular culture (pp.
959-1016) almost invariably assigns negative meanings and images to
groups of color, except for the rare periods in which it assigns ridiculously
romanticized ones to them such as the noble savage.
Professor Abrams also encourages us in the next edition to address
interminority tensions and conflicts.38 This is a sore point in communities
of color right now. Consider a situation like the controversy over admissions quotas at Lowell High School challenged in Ho v. S.F. Unified
School District (p.745), where tension persists between Asian Americans
and African Americans. We decided the proper role for us as casebook
authors was to discuss the Ho case as an example of the need for negotiation and coalition, and to show that intergroup social dynamics may sometimes be fraught with the same struggles over self-interest as those between
a minority group and the majority. We doubt that it would be wise for us to
do more than this. In particular, we think it would be unwarranted for us to
take a stand on who is right and who is wrong in that controversy. While
intergroup complaints between communities of color might theoretically
rise to such an egregious level that progressive scholars such as ourselves
could not avoid taking a stand, we found no such cases in our research.
38.

Id. at 1601.
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Professor Abrams also chides us, somewhat surprisingly, for remaining mired in a Black-White paradigm. 9 This casebook, of course, is the
first expressly to expand beyond that paradigm and consider the racial fortunes, issues, problems, and histories of all the major groups of color in the
United States, and include the construction of Whiteness (pp. 3 04-09, 47177). Thus, practically every chapter on a substantive topic, such as hate
speech or popular culture, devotes attention to all the major groups. However, one of the lessons of the differential racialization thesis is that each of
the groups has been racialized in different, but overlapping, ways (pp. 1-2,
14-15). Thus, for example, immigration and language rights play little role
in Black history. Mexican Americans suffered conquest, but were not enslaved in a literal sense. Accordingly, any organizational scheme that sets
out to march determinedly through a four-part matrix under every single
topic heading would distort history. Thus, we have tried to devote attention
to the rich tapestry of race, realizing that not every strand attaches to every
other.
Professor Abrams also complains that our book is missing a praxis.4"
Robert Williams provides part of the answer to that complaint: Indian
history (like that of most of the groups we consider) teaches legal skepticism.4' We believe that a book that highlights how frail a reed the law has
proven to be for oppressed peoples provides a valuable dose of skepticism
and realism for would-be lawyers. The young lawyer wins cases she knows
she should have lost, loses cases she knows she should have won. Judges
can be biased. Jurors can kowtow to a domineering foreperson. One's clients can lose their nerve or lie. We suspect that law students who take the
time to develop their own radical critique of social institutions, including
the law, will enter practice with a type of psychic armoring that will enable
them to persevere in the face of resistance and disappointment. Perhaps this
is the most valuable praxis lesson of all, and one we very much hope readers will take from our book.
B.

ProfessorAlfieri

Toward the end of his critique, Professor Alfieri poses a curious challenge. "To render prescriptive counsel properly," he writes, Race and
Races' editors "must confront the tension dividing modem and postmodern
' He notes that we appear to both "condemn and
modes of analysis."42
' We also simultaneously "ridicule
exploit the hegemonic logic of law."43
and embrace formalism and process values... [and both] celebrate
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 1600.
Id. at 1601-02.
Williams, supra note 22, at 1634-36.
Anthony Alfieri, Teaching the Law of Race, 89 CALIF. L. REv. 1605, 1624 (2001).
Id.
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multiracial identity and assail" those methods of advocacy that appear to
him incompatible with that identity. He suggests that we are ambivalent
about rights.45 To be sure, Alfieri professes a gracious understanding of our
predicament, for we "labor in the ambiguity of this long moment of
transition."4 6 He concludes by declaring "We should be grateful for their
leadership. We should hope they do not grow weary."'47
We are not weary. However, if we were to set ourselves the task of
reconciling modernism and postmodernism, formalism and its opposite,
multiracialism and conventional Anglocentric advocacy, we might well
grow so. But these are not our tasks. As we imply in the sections devoted
to strategies and methods of reform, we are prepared to embrace an unapologetic eclecticism (pp. 3, 1091-1154). Just as race and racism take different forms at different periods and in relation to different minority
groups, the tools of resistance must likewise vary. In one setting, litigation
may be a perfectly sensible means of confronting a particular evil. In another, litigation may be fruitless; mass demonstration or storytelling48 or
enlistment of race traitors49 may be needed. Some racial roadblocks may
yield to discourse analysis; others may be better addressed by efforts to
change material conditions." In some situations, such as the army or organized sports, formality may guarantee at least a degree of fairness.5 In
others, free-flowing coalition politics and interpersonal friendships may be
what the situation requires.
In short, the traditional either/or categories Alfieri lists are not well
tailored to addressing the vast panoply of race. This is both a disadvantage
and a blessing. Students and fellow travelers cannot tie themselves to a
single theory of race, any more than they can rely on a unitary method of
resistance.
CONCLUSION

The complexity of "race," of "races," and their development and deployment through United States history cannot be confined by simple categories and facile resolutions. Some of the questions raised by our reviewers
44. Id.
45. See id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. See Richard Delgado, Storytellingfor Oppositionists and Others: A Pleafor Narrative, 87
MICH. L. REv. 2411(1988).
49. On the concept of race traitor, see Race and Races (pp. 489, 493).
50. See Richard Delgado, Two Ways to Think About Race: Reflections on the Id, the Ego, and
other Reformist Theories of Equal Protection, 89 GEo. L.J. 2279 (2001); Delgado, TiH LA'rNO/A
CoNDIToN, supra note 27, at 303-45 (describing role of rebellious lawyering and street politics in
effecting reform).
51. See Richard Delgado et al., Fairnessand Formality: Minimizing the Risk of Prejudice in
Alternative Dispute Resolution, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 1359 (1985).
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allow no easy solutions. Accordingly, the multidisciplinary, historical approach we have taken in the book is pragmatic and eclectic. 2 We have
sought to give voice to stunning silences and omissions of race, to provide
history and resources that we hope will enable us, in Professor
Yamamoto's words, "to 'talk about it."' 53
The perceptive insights of these distinguished reviewers give us much
to think about. We are grateful to them for their knowledge, their insights,
and their criticisms, all of which we find helpful in understanding what our
book means to others and how we can make it better.

52. C.f Catharine Pierce Wells, Why Pragmatism Works for Me, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 347, 353
(2000) ("Good lawyers do not obsessively adhere to a single theory. Instead they try to keep their
minds free so that they are receptive to various ways of formulating the issues."); Margaret Jane Radin,
The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S. CAL. L. REv. 1699, 1700 (1990) ("We must look carefully at
the nonideal circumstances in each case and decide which horn of the dilemma is better (or less bad),
and we must keep re-deciding as time goes on.").
53. Yamamoto, supranote 35, at 1651. Even as we write, the conservative American Civil Rights
Coalition, an arm of Ward Connerly's American Civil Rights Institute, has unveiled a new proposed
initiative for the March 2002 California ballot. The measure, titled the "Racial Privacy Initiative,"
would prevent the state from "classify[ing] any individual by race, ethnicity, color or national origin in
the operation of public education, public contracting or public employment." Under the measure, the
state would be prohibited from collecting data about an individual's race on government forms for the
purpose of detecting racial discrimination. Letter from Kevin Nguyen, Executive Director, and M.
Royce Van Tassell, Director of Research, American Civil Rights Coalition, to Tricia Knight, Initiative
Coordinator, Office of the Attorney General of California, 2-3 (Feb. 20, 2001) (on file with authors).
However, police uses of race, including the controversial practice of "racial profiling," would be
specifically exempted from the ban. Letter from Elizabeth B. Guillen, Legislative Counsel, Mexican
American Legal Defense and Education Fund, to Joe Shinstock, California Department of Finance 7-8
(Mar. 14, 2001) (on file with authors) (arguing that law enforcement will, in practice, have a difficult
time distinguishing uses of race authorized by the statute and those not authorized). But see Libertarian
Party, Reviewer's Guide to the "California Racial Privacy Initiative" (Jan. 12, 2001), at
http://www.peoplesveto.org/lp/textfiles/010112%20lnitiative.txt
(claiming that "[s]ince racial
profiling is already illegal, this exemption does not make it legal"). Yet another attempt to make
matters of race unspeakable seemingly awaits in the wings.

